Modularity issue... or issues?

A widely held assumption in evolutionary psychology is that our brains are composed of modules, all of which have evolved for solving special adaptive problems. There are strong theoretical arguments for this position and there is a lot of empirical evidence too. However, in discussing the modularity issue, many authors seem to conflate several different issues. For instance, when discussing modularity, often mention is made of research in which it was shown that babies and infants have (implicit) knowledge of the world, which they presumably could not have learned. This seems to deal more with what could be called 'innate knowledge' than with any modules. Also, there is the fact that some things seem to be learned easier than others. For instance, fobias for snakes and heights are much more common than fobias for cars and electricity sockets, although the latter two are, in our society, much more dangerous. If fobias merely came into existence because of learning processes, one would expect that fobias for the more abundantly present things and situations were more common. This is sometimes called 'learning preparedness'. This, too, seems to be more or less unconnected to the modularity assumption. In my opinion, since it is quite unclear what evolutionary psychology's modules are supposed to be, something might be gained by making these differences more explicit than has been done so far.

Eric Rietzschel

• How Many Angels Can Dance in Our Heads by James Brody, 11/10/98
  • 'Modularity' may be a misleading term by Eric Rietzschel, 11/10/98
    • The Many Meanings of Modules by Mike Hall, 12/1/98