Speaking of Saddam Hussein...

Saddam Hussein: A Case Study in Narcissism. The Psychiatric Times, 1990, Vol. VII, No. 10, pp. 1, 11-14.

by Howard Fishman

"The Psychiatric Times: Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, ordered his troops to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990. President Bush has since referred to Saddam as a 'Hitler,' a 'liar,' and a 'murderer.' Political pundits and government figures have described Saddam as 'a megalomaniac,' 'the Butcher of Baghdad,' and 'the Madman of the Middle East' . . . (1990, p. 1).
"Jerrold Post, M.D.: . . . . Such prejorative diagnoses are both invalid and ill-advised: Consigning Saddam to the realm of madness could mislead decision makers into believing that he is irrationaland unpredictable.
"While Saddam is psychologically in touch with reality, it is apparent that he is often out of touch with political reality. . . . His advisers, for example, are simply sycophants: He rules through fear. . . . When he persisted in encouraging their frank and canid advice, Dr. Ibrahim (an Oxford-trained physician who was Iraq's Minister of Health) suggested that Saddam might consider stepping down temporarily [in 1982] with the understanding that he would resume leadership after a peace treaty was concluded [with Iran]. Saddam thanked him for his candor and had him arrested. Ibrahim's wife pled for her husband's return, and Saddam promised that the physician would return home.
"The next day, Ibrahim's body--chopped into small pieces--was delivered to his wife in a black canvas body bag. . . ."

"I have often observed that the ranks of world leaders would be perilously thinned if all narcissistic personalities were suddenly disqualified. But Saddam's case is extreme. We have abundant evidence that he is determined to do and get whatever he wants and that (1990, p. 10) he will brook no interference. He is in no sense burdened by conscience and, thus, will do whatever seems necessary to achieve his personal and political ambitions."

"Saddam, whose name means 'the fighter who stands steadfast,' has frequently mentioned Gammal Abdul Nasser as one of his idols. . . (p. 11). The other heroes with whom Saddam identifies and compares himself are Tito, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung, and Castro."

"Saddam, the prime 'maker' of the invasion [of Kuwait], thus depicts himself as 'the pride of the Arabs, their protector, and their model of nobel values.' He also offers himself as their 'legitimate father.' So, we see a union of Saddam's personality with his political ideology. He is ruthless in fulfilling his messianic mission, as suggested by the notion of a 'pathological grandiose self,' and views himself as the supreme Arab nationalist leader."

"He has established a cult of personality: Saddam carefully and conscientiously cultivates the admiration of the Arab populace. . . .
". . . Saddam tends to view the world in extremes: If you are not totally on his side, you are his enemy. So, nuances of human personality are of little interest to him. Again, whether as individuals or as groups, he related to human beings as cardboard objects.
"His insecurity is evidenced by his need to regularly test the absolute loyalty and devotion of his followers. . .

". . . He is clearly envious of the wealth and power of (p. 12) other Arab leaders. At the same time, he has depreciated their claims to leadership of the Arab world, characterizing them as his inferiors and as misguided interlopers or puppets of the Western imperialists. His popularity with the Arab masses capitalizes on their poverty and their resentment and envy of Kuwait and Saudi wealth.
". . . . By characterizing Kuwait and Saudi leaders as 'tools of the capitalists,' he accomplishes dual objectives: He devalues that which he envies and, at the same time, garners the admiration of the Arab masses.
"Saddam's grandiosity leads him to overestimate the extent of which he is supported by the rest of the Arab world. This may be a form of projective identification but, in any case, he psychologically assumes that many in the Arab world, especially the downtrodden, share his views and that he is their hero. While he does enjoy much adulation from the Arab masses, I believe he was shocked by the extensive participation of other Arab nations in condemning his invasion of Kuwait and joining the international boycott. My hunch is that he has rationalized this realization by devaluing the Arab leaders while continuing to believe in the loyalty of the masses."

'. . . His only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein. That's why it is not appropriate to describe his methods as 'revolutionary pragmatism,' or what he calls 'the exceptionalism of revolutionary needs.
"Saddam uses others to achieve both his personal and political goals, but does not ever trust them. A good example is his treatment of the Secret Police chief whose assistance was critical in the 1968 coup. After they had emerged victorious, Saddam had this fellow exiled--and eventually assassinated--simply because he was not Baathist."

"Saddam is not ambivalent about violence; his doctrine of 'revolutionary exceptionalism' provides his intellec- (p. 13) utal justification. But, his unconstrained aggressiveness is instrumental as well; his murders are rationalized as necessary for the revolution. Simply, if an enemy needs to be killed, he kills them; if a country needs to be taken, he takes it.
"There are several illustrations of ego syntonic aggression which might be cited. His use of chemical warfare against the Kurdish minority in Iraq might be considered heinous by Westerners. Saddam, who dehumanizes his enemies, casually views such action as appropriate treatment of anyone who would resist him and the holy revolution.
"There are also clear indications of a paranoid orientation. He fears retaliation from others because of what he has done, so he frequently accuses others of being the primary aggressor. Saddam ignores his own role in provoking the hostility, and then acts in anticipation of the expected aggression. Indeed, he not only sees himself as surrounded by enemies, but he is quite righteous in he way he threatens his targets. Thus, he portrays himself as the victim rather than the victimizer."

". . . . Our government's objective cannot be to rehabilitate Saddam.
"Nonetheless, devaluing or dehumanizing Saddam is not a wise tactic for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the likelihood of encouraging an extreme reaction from him. And that's a further reason for my having suggested that epithets are not appropriate in dealing with Saddam.
"Further, I think it essential to understand that in spite of the fact that Saddam is both opportunistic and determined to get what he wants, he has also been notably flexible in his ability to change course when he perceives that he has miscalculated. He is not a martyr; he will not go down in the last flaming bunker if he sees a way out while saving face and remaining in power. However, he can be expected to lash out violently and to go to go to extreme lengths if he sees his survival and power at stake."

"We need to be vigilant. Even if the current situation is eased by Iraq's withdrawing from Kuwait, Saddam's history suggests that we cannot be sanguine about his ultimate intentions. Intelligence estimates suggests that he will regain his nuclear capability within the next few years. He may well conclude that his current misadventure cannot succeed, but it would not be inconsistent with his previous behavior for him to simply postpone annexation of Kuwait to a more propitious moment. It should also be anticipated that thwarting Saddam's open expression of aggression may result in increased Iraq-sponsored terrorism.
"In general, this type of person will most likely respond to firm limit-setting and the realization that dire consequences will ensure from boundary violations. However, we must understand that even if the U.S. government takes such action, a positive outcome is not necessarily assured. While we may be able to deal effectively with Saddam's idiosyncratic tendencies, there are a host of uncontrollable and unforeseeable political variables which may intervene to destabilize the situation" (p. 14).

Fishman, Howard. (October 1990). Saddam Hussein: A Case Study in Narcissism. The Psychiatric Times, Vol. VII, No. 10, pp. 1, 11-14.

Psychologists explore war's roots: National self-interest, differences in U. S. and Iraqi cultures are cited. The American Psychologist, March, 1991, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 1, 31.

by Tori DeAngelis

"'If we get into an armed situation, [Saddam] is going to get his ass kicked.'" --President George Bush

"'Should the Americans become embroiled, we will make them swim in their own blood Allah willing.'" --President Saddam Hussein (APA, 1991, p. 1)

". . . social psychologist, Paul Kimmel expanded on his belief that a series of culturally insensitive blunders helped fan the flames of the current crises [in the Persian Gulf].

". . . Kimmel focused on American mistakes because 'we are most expert in our own culture.' But, he noted, that's not to say the Iraqis didn't make an equal share of errors.
"One American oversight was the appointment of a woman, April Glaspie, as U. S. ambassador to Iraq, wrote Kimmel.
"'In the Arab world, equality between the sexes is nowhere to be found--not in the Koran, not in art, not in literature,' Kimmel said in an interview. The ambassador's gender, added to her status as a Western 'infidel' from a technological society, made her a 'very weak negotiator' in Arab eyes, he said.
"Another problem arose when, as Iraqi forces massed on the border with Kuwait, Glaspie gave Iraqi President Saddam Hussein the 'very unclear message' that the United States was 'not interested in border disputes.'
"Kimmel wrote, 'That probably gave Saddam the idea that the United States wouldn't attack Iraq over what he considered a border issue--namely, the invasion of Kuwait, Kimmel noted.
"The United States also ignored the Arab focus on the importance of establishing relationships in the personal and diplomatic arenas, completely dismissing such a possibility with Saddam, Kimmel argued.
"In the absence of such a respectful relationship with the Iraqi president, the United States also neglected to find a 'mutually acceptable intermediary . . . to fully explore options,' Kimmel added.
"Likewise, the United States didn't at any point try to treat Saddam Hussein as an equal, Kimmel wrote. That omission was 'especially insensitive in the context of shame-oriented cultures such as those of many Arabs,' Kimmel wrote. Provoking Saddam by poking at his pride probably further incited him to stand up to the United States, Kimmel speculated.
"And the Bush administration focused on strict deadlines--an orientation antithetical to the more leisurely Arab perspective on time, he wrote. Finally, by focusing on face-to-face meetings 'in the full glare of publicity,' the Americans 'made it very difficult [for Saddam] to save face,' he wrote.
"[Psychologist and negotiation expert, Dean] Pruitt summed it up this way: 'You can point to mistakes made on the part of Bush, like [his] saying he'd kick [Saddam's] ass . . . . That would get the back up of anyone. If you want to negotiate, you don't say things like that.'
"Social psychologist Ervin Straub speculated that there were probably a number of psychological reasons 'why Bush was in such a hurry' to get into war. . . .
"One psychological motivation on Bush's part might be guilt over the U. S. support of Saddam during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, Staub theorized.
"'Here is a man who used chemical weapons on his own people,' and the United States backed him up with military and agricultural goods, said Staub.
"He speculated that Bush 'felt the need to compensate' for backing Saddam. And because the American way is not to admit mistakes, Bush instead went as far as he could to show that America thinks the Iraqi president is a bad guy, he said.
"A personal factor that might be related to Bush's inability to simply apologize is 'his need to overcome this label, this designation' of being a 'wimp,' said Staub.
"Staub, who has done extensive research on passive bystanders and how they may perpetuate evil by tacit consent, added, 'Saddam couldn't have invaded Kuwait without the rest of the world allowing that to take place.'
"Congress, too, essentially acted as a passive bystander when it gave Bush the go-ahead to being a war, he said.
"In many ways, the United States employed 'an outmoded psychology' in its dealings with Iraq before the Gulf war erupted, added psychologist Mike Wessels. . . .
"The United States put itself in a state of 'unacceptable risk' by building up so many troops in the region, which provoked tensions in the Middle East as a result. . . . It also used and continues to use heavy-handed 'enemy imaging' of Saddam, 'such as comparing him to Hitler. . . (1991, p. 1).

"The commitment model posits that the more fervently one is committed to a position, 'the more likely one is to act on extreme beliefs,' said [Social Psychologist, Charles] Kiesler. Overcommitment 'in essence traps you into the potential for reduced alternatives,' he said.
"Saddam has 'adopted a defiant posture' that in many ways is intended to 'play to Arab audiences,' Keisler thinks. 'Because of the public nature of his commitment' to the Arab people, Saddam 'felt himself forced to act as if any capitulation was a sign of weakness,' he speculated.
"Pruitt commented that the United States before the war was in the awkward position of feeling it necessary to publicly project an uncompromising position, while perhaps secretly hoping to avert war through diplomatic means.
"The United States could not 'be a problem-solving negotiator and at the same time put together a coalition dedicated to getting rid of this threat,' he said. In that sense, the United States was 'locked in by its strategy,' said Pruitt.

"Social psychologist David Sears speculated that Americans years of experience dealing with the . . . Cold War . . . the psychology of the cold war 'made it easy for Bush to frame the conflict in terms of containment' of aggressive forces. 'He has had some success in selling that view,' he said. . . .
"Staub commented that a number of complex psychosocial and psychopolitical factors have conspired together to perpetuate American support for the war.
"Most Americans can support the war because of a current identity crisis in the country, he thinks. On one hand, Americans are used to perceiving their country as a superpower, strong and invincible. 'We've developed this democracy that's the wonder of the world, and we have this amazing technology,' he said.
"On the other, the country is actually in a state of social and economic upheaval and decline, said Staub. This disparity makes it more compelling to defend the country as the strong nation it has previously been, he said.
"Another psychological feature operating in the maintenance of the war by both Americans and Iraqis is the notion that aggression justifies further aggression, said Staub. The use of aggression in the name of a good cause 'makes aggression more acceptable, more of a normal operating procedure,' he said.
"War can also be perpetuated by he tendency to ignore the humanity of the other side--a tendency supported by the mass media's complicit agreement with government officials not to report news or images of the war from Iraq's point of view, said Staub. During the invasion of Panama, for instance, 'there was a lot of talk about 'our losses,' but not a lot of talk about the number of Panamanian civilians who died,' he said.
"An additional factor that might help keep the war going is each side's stubborn belief 'that it can win,' said Pruitt. 'If each side thinks it has the strength to win in its own sense, then the chances of getting a negotiated agreement are exceedingly slim,' he said.

"Kimmel suggested President Bush make a symbolic gesture toward Iraq.
"The problem-solving strategies of veteran conflict negotiators such as Herbert Kelman, Edward Azar, John Burton and Leonard Doob should also be used, he stressed. For instance, Kelman, who is the PsySR [Psychologists for Social Responsibility] president and chair of the Middle East Seminar at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, has had success conducting workshops with Israelis and Palestinians. The workshops are designed to help each side listen to the other's point of view and work toward a resolution of their differences.
"In addition, 'we will need to really listen to what [the Iraqis] say, considering their concerns seriously and respectfully,' Kimmel wrote. Keeping an objective perspective on the American bias about time, deadlines and 'facts' will help Americans be more sensitive 'to the possibility of differences in perspective in other cultures,' Kimmel wrote.
"Just as passive bystanders can encourage the continuation of wrongdoing, active bystanders can help turn the tide toward peace, Straub believes.
"'Without clear values, it is extremely difficult for people to speak out, and also to think in opposition to the group,' he said.
"It takes an effort of will to stand apart and oppose something on higher moral grounds, but it can be done, he added.
"When the war ends, Staub said he hopes the opportunity arises for a few new political concepts to replace some tired old ones.
"These new values include making basic human values a part of the 'national interest'; expecting nations to respect the human rights of their own citizens and not aggress against other nations; and urging nations to respond earlier to aggression through peaceful means such as boycotts and sanctions, he said.
"Sears said he thinks the war has stirred up some issues that challenge old views and will have to be addressed.
"One of these is the disparity between the 'haves' and 'have nots,' he believes. "Rather than seeing [the war] as a struggle between a greedy, expansionistic dictator and right-minded people, you could view it in essence as a class struggle and a nationalistic struggle,' in which Saddam is, standing up for his own relatively poor nation in particular and the rights of poor Arabs generally, Sears said.
"Psychologists interviewed expressed some exasperation that while they've been discussing ways to try peaceful alternatives for years, policy makers don't seem to listen to them until it's too late.
"Why do people come to us only when they're in a mess?' Kimmel asked. 'It burns me up when I hear we had no choices. We had a thousand choices. We put ourselves in this situation (p. 31).'"

DeAngelis, Tori. (March 1991). Psychologists explore war's roots: National self-interest, differences in U.S. and Iraqi cultures are cited. The American Psychologist, Vol. 22, No. 3, p. 1, 31.

"As Machiavelli says, either destroy a man or leave him alone entirely. Inflicting half punishment or mild injury will only create an enemy whose bitterness will grow with time, and who will take revenge. When you beat an enemy, then, make your victory complete. Crush him into nonexistence. In the moment of victory, you do not restrain yourself from crushing the enemy you have defeated, but rather from needlessly advancing against others. Be merciless with your enemy, but do not create new enemies by overreaching" (Greene, 1998, p. 418).

Greene, Robert.(1998). The 48 Laws of Power. New York: Viking.

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